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While syntactic reanalysis has been extensively investigated in psycholinguistics, comparatively little is known
about reanalysis in the semantic domain. We used event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to keep track of semantic
processes involved in understanding short narratives such as ‘The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled
coffee on the paper’. We hypothesize that these sentences are interpreted in two steps: (1) when the progressive clause
is processed, a discourse model is computed in which the goal state (a complete letter) is predicted to hold; (2) when
the subordinate clause is processed, the initial representation is recomputed to the effect that, in the final discourse
structure, the goal state is not satisfied. Critical sentences evoked larger sustained anterior negativities (SANs) com-
pared to controls, starting around 400 ms following the onset of the sentence-final word, and lasting for about
400 ms. The amplitude of the SAN was correlated with the frequency with which participants, in an offline
probe-selection task, responded that the goal state was not attained. Our results raise the possibility that the brain
supports some form of non-monotonic recomputation to integrate information which invalidates previously held
assumptions.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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In the past three decades experimental research using
event-related potentials (ERPs) has provided numerous
insights into word, sentence and discourse comprehen-
sion. However, as has been noted, ‘‘a cognitive neurosci-
ence approach to language has not as yet merged with
linguistic and psycholinguistic research programmes”0749-596X/$ - see front matter  2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserve
doi:10.1016/j.jml.2008.02.005
* Corresponding author. Fax: +31 024 3610989.
E-mail address: g.baggio@fcdonders.ru.nl (G. Baggio).(Brown & Hagoort, 1999). One linguistic research pro-
gram that may contribute to understanding the basis
of meaning in the human brain is semantic theory. Logi-
cians and formal semanticists since the ‘dynamic turn’
(Peregrin, 2003) have shifted their attention from
describing semantic competence to modeling cognitive
update and information exchange. A case in point is a
recent proposal by van Lambalgen and Hamm (2004)
which regards comprehension as an incremental, yet
non-monotonic process whereby temporary structures
are set up in working memory and may be later revised
on the basis of further discourse information. Althoughd.
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ham, Oakhill, & Cain, 1996; Sturt, 2007), the issue has
arguably received less attention than it deserves. The
purpose of the present study is to contribute filling this
gap. We used ERPs to test a processing hypothesis pro-
posed by Baggio and van Lambalgen (2007) as an appli-
cation of the formal, non-monotonic semantics of tense
and aspect of van Lambalgen and Hamm (2004).
ERP research on semantic processing
Event-related potentials have proved useful to
address a number of issues concerning the relative com-
plexity and time course of semantic processes. Kutas and
Hillyard (1980) conducted the first ERP experiment in
which linguistic factors were successfully manipulated,
in this case the semantic plausibility of a word given
the preceding sentence context:(1) a. The officer shot the man with a gun ferb. The officer shot the man with a moon (‘suCompared to ‘gun’, the anomalous noun ‘moon’
resulted in a larger negative shift starting around
250 ms after word onset, peaking at 400 ms, and lasting
for approximately another 150 ms. This ERP compo-
nent, called N400 after its polarity and peak latency, is
known not to be affected by other unexpected events,
such as variations in the physical properties of the stim-
uli. Larger N400s are also triggered by semantically
plausible words which are nevertheless judged as less
preferred in a given sentence context (Hagoort & Brown,
1994; Kutas & Hillyard, 1984), for example ‘pocket’ in
(2b):(2) a. Jenny put the sweet in her mouth after the lesson
b. Jenny put the sweet in her pocket after the lessonThe amplitude of the N400 is also modulated by lex-
ical items which provide information conflicting with the
discourse context (van Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown,
1999; van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Hagoort, & Brown,
2003) or world knowledge (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen,
& Petersson, 2004). In sum, although every content
word evokes an N400, the amplitude of the negative
shift appears to be affected by the degree of semantic
fit of a lexical item with the preceding context and the
knowledge base relevant for its integration.
Semantics-related negativities different from the
N400 have also been found. Van Berkum and colleagues
recorded ERPs while subjects read (van Berkum, Brown,
& Hagoort, 1999) and listened to (van Berkum, Brown,
Hagoort, & Zwitserlood, 2003) discourses in which a
particular NP in a target sentence could denote eithera single referent introduced in the preceding discourse
or two equally suitable referents. For instance, (3c), con-
taining the NP ‘the girl’, could follow either the single-
referent context (3a) or the double-referent context (3b):(3) a. David had told the boy and the girl to clean up
their room before lunch time. But the boy had
stayed in bed all morning, and the girl had been
on the phone all the timeb. David had told the two girls to clean up their
room before lunch time. But one of the girls had
stayed in bed all morning, and the other had been
on the phone all the timec. David told the girl that. . .Referentially ambiguous NPs, such as ‘the girl’ in (3c)
following (3b), elicited a sustained anterior negativity
(SAN), emerging 300–400 ms after noun onset and last-
ing for several hundreds of milliseconds. The SAN dif-
ed from typical instances of the N400 in duration
stained’) and scalp distribution (‘anterior’). Follow-
ing earlier claims (Mecklinger, Schriefers, Steinhauer,
& Friederici, 1995; Mu¨ller, King, & Kutas, 1997), the
time-course and topographical profile of the observed
ERPs are taken to suggest that ‘‘at least some of the pro-
cessing consequences of referential ambiguity may
involve an increased demand on memory resources”
(van Berkum et al., 2003).
Another study (Mu¨nte, Schiltz, & Kutas, 1998)
reported sustained anterior negativities. ERPs were
recorded while subjects read narratives differing in the
initial temporal connective:(4) a. After the scientist submitted the paper, the
journal changed its policyb. Before the scientist submitted the paper, the
journal changed its policy‘Before’ sentences elicited a larger sustained negativ-
ity, maximal over left anterior sites. At the left frontal
electrode, ERP responses to ‘before’ and ‘after’ diverged
approximately 300 ms after sentence onset. The effect
lasted throughout the sentence and was larger during
the second clause. The difference of anterior negativity
between ‘before’ and ‘after’ items was positively corre-
lated with participants’ working memory span. Mu¨nte
et al. argue that the slow negative shift evoked by
‘before’ sentences reflects working memory operations
involved in computing a model for (4b) in which the
events are represented in their actual order of occur-
rence. That is, in contrast with (4a), (4b) requires addi-
tional memory resources as the two events are
mentioned in reverse temporal order.
The connection between sustained anterior negativi-
ties and working memory is explicit in van Berkum
et al. (1999), van Berkum et al. (2003) and Mu¨nte
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functional account, based on linguistically-informed
notions, of these findings. For instance, while van Ber-
kum et al. suggest that the sustained anterior negativity
reflects ‘referential processing’, Mu¨nte et al. seem to
implicate that ‘additional discourse-level computations’
of the temporal and causal profiles of the events
described by ‘before’ and ‘after’ sentences are responsi-
ble for the observed slow negative shifts. Matters appear
to be further complicated by the finding that sustained
anterior negativities are elicited by constructions in
which complexity at the syntax-semantics interface is
affected, as in long-distance wh-dependencies (Felser,
Clahsen, & Mu¨nte, 2003; Fiebach, Schlesewsky, &
Friederici, 2002; King & Kutas, 1995; Mu¨ller et al.,
1997; Phillips, Kazanina, & Abada, 2005).
Despite the differences between the conditions in
which sustained anterior negativities have been
observed, the proposed processes can be brought under
a single umbrella term, which we shall refer to as ‘com-
puting a discourse model’. Formal semantics, at least
since Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) (Kamp,
1981), has assumed that interpreting definite and indefi-
nite NPs, resolving anaphoric pronouns, determining
the order of events, establishing wh-dependencies and
other cross-clause and cross-sentence processes concur
in the construction of a discourse model, that is, a cog-
nitive representation making a given narrative true.
More recent proposals, which build upon DRT and
add some sophistication to it, regard discourse compre-
hension as a process in which lexical meanings, context
and world knowledge interact to produce consistent dis-
course representations (Hamm, Kamp, & van Lambal-
gen, 2006; van Lambalgen & Hamm, 2004). Pragmatic
constraints and causal/world knowledge are brought to
the fore by these accounts. Furthermore, discourse mod-
els as envisaged by the theory (called ‘minimal models’,
see ‘‘Minimal models, inference in the limit and recom-
putation” section) can be efficiently computed by artifi-
cial neural networks, which account for some
capabilities and limitations of working memory (Sten-
ning & van Lambalgen, 2005). Therefore, in this frame-
work it becomes possible to raise and address a number
of issues concerning the complexity of computing dis-
course models in working memory. To see in some detail
how this could be done, we must first introduce the lin-
guistic phenomenon with which we shall be concerned:
the ‘imperfective paradox’.
The imperfective paradox
Verb phrases (VPs) can be semantically classified as
states (‘know’, ‘love’, etc.), activities (‘run’, ‘write’,
etc.), accomplishments (‘write a letter’, ‘bake a cake’,
etc.), achievements (‘finish’, ‘reach’, etc.) and points
(‘flash’, ‘hop’, etc.) (Steedman, 1997). Accomplishmentsinvolve the activity from which they are derived. For
instance, ‘write a letter’ is constituted by the activity
‘write’ and the direct object ‘a letter’, which need not
refer to an existing entity, but carries information about
the goal toward which the writing activity is directed.
Here we use the term ‘activity’ to denote both the aspec-
tual class of VPs such as ‘write’ in the above classifica-
tion and the atelic process involved in all
accomplishments. We use ‘progressive’ and ‘imperfec-
tive’ interchangeably to allow the reader to see the
connection between the semantics of the progressive
and the imperfective paradox, although this is not
entirely correct (Comrie, 1976).
Let us consider accomplishments first:
(5) The girl was writing a letter when her friend
spilled coffee on the tablecloth.
From (5) the reader would typically conclude that,
barring unforeseen circumstances, the girl will attain
the desired goal and would thus assent to the statement
‘The girl has written a letter’ (see Sections ‘‘Entailment
questionnaire” and ‘‘Behavioral data” for evidence sup-
porting this claim). Such an inference is based on the
assumption that spilling coffee on the tablecloth is usu-
ally neutral with respect to the writing activity, that is,
it is not a typical immediate cause leading to the termi-
nation of the activity. It is possible to imagine situations
in which writing was temporarily interrupted or even
terminated by the accident. However, as the data
reported in Sections ‘‘Entailment questionnaire” and
‘‘Behavioral data” will demonstrate, failing to explicitly
mention an obstacle in the discourse is sufficient to lead
the reader to assume that there was no such obstacle to
attaining the intended goal.
We hypothesize that the inference to a goal state is
defeasible or non-monotonic, that is, it can be suppressed
if the discourse describes an event which terminates the
relevant activity:
(6) The girl was writing a letter when her friend
spilled coffee on the paper.
Assuming that writing was intended to occur on the
same paper sheets on which coffee was spilled, the acci-
dent is sufficient to terminate the activity and it is there-
fore a disabling condition for obtaining a complete
letter. Accordingly, on the basis of (6) the reader would
assent to ‘The girl has written no letter’.
Suppression can obtain only with accomplishments,
not with activities (Rothstein, 2004). In accomplish-
ments, the object NP ‘a letter’ expresses the existence
of a natural culmination point or ‘canonical goal’
toward which the writing activity is directed, namely a
complete letter. Activities, for instance ‘writing letters’,
do not involve any such canonical goal. The use of the
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(for the speaker and the hearer) unspecified and that,
therefore, the activity has no natural culmination point.
Accordingly, a narrative containing the activity VP
‘writing letters’ will be interpreted as entailing that
‘The girl has written one or more letters’ regardless of
the consequences of the second event on the writing
activity:
(7) The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled
coffee on the tablecloth.
(8) he girl was writing letters when her friend spilled
coffee on the paper.
There appears to be something paradoxical about (6)
in its relation to (5), which is not found in the pair (7)
and (8). Whereas it belongs to the meaning of the
accomplishment ‘writing a letter’ that the writing activ-
ity is directed toward the goal state of a complete letter,
the actual occurrence of that consequent state can be
denied without contradiction. How can an essential
component of the meaning be denied without destroying
meaning itself? This is the so-called ‘imperfective para-
dox’. We now turn to its processing consequences.
Minimal models, inference in the limit and recomputation
Language processing amounts to incrementally com-
puting a discourse representation given lexical, syntactic
and contextual constraints (Hagoort, 2006). To make
computation tractable, discourse models must be ‘mini-
mal’, that is, in a precise mathematical sense (van Lam-
balgen & Hamm, 2004), the simplest possible structures
making the narrative true. Minimal models behave like
‘closed worlds’, in which only those propositions which
are asserted in discourse, or which can be inferred from
it or from background knowledge, are represented as
true in the model. For the remaining cases, a distinction
must be drawn. Propositions which are mentioned in
discourse, but are not asserted and do not follow from
what is said or from background knowledge (e.g. the
antecedent of a conditional), are represented as false in
the minimal model. In logical terms, these propositions
still belong to the finite language upon which the con-
struction of the minimal model is based. But as long
as nothing forces their truth, they will be taken as false.
Propositions which are not part of the finite language—
because they do not occur in the discourse context or in
background knowledge—are not included in the mini-
mal model, that is, they are not represented as being
either true or false.
One important upshot of the theory is that the
occurrence of a goal state can be inferred from a min-
imal model of a discourse containing an accomplish-
ment in the past progressive. As soon as the
sentence ‘The girl was writing a letter’ is processed,the system constructs a minimal model in which the
goal state (a complete letter) is attained at some time
later than the interval referred to by the progressive.
Two remarks concerning this crucial point are in
order. First, interpretation is based on the ‘closed
world assumption’: if no disabling condition is
described in discourse (so far), it will be (temporarily)
assumed that there is no obstacle interfering with the
writing activity. Second, the conclusion that eventually
a letter is accomplished is an instance of predictive
inference or, more precisely, inference in the limit:
given that writing is asserted to hold some time in
the past, that it can be assumed there are no obstacles
for the writing activity, that some form of inertia
holds (writing continues if it is not hindered by exter-
nal forces) and that a letter is a finite object, it can be
expected that the process will converge—‘in the
limit’—to a complete letter. This holds for both neu-
tral (5) and disabled (6) accomplishments. Now, when
the initial model is extended with a ‘when’ clause
describing an event which terminates the writing activ-
ity (i.e. a disabling condition), the goal state inference
will be suppressed. The subordinate clause ‘when her
friend spilled coffee on the paper’ will lead to the
retrieval of causal knowledge from semantic memory
to the effect that the coffee accident terminated the
writing activity. Spilling occurred during the writing
process, from which follows that the accident took
place before a complete letter was obtained. The writ-
ing event can be imagined as an open interval, where
the goal state (a complete letter) is no longer part of
the structure. We shall use the term ‘recomputation’
to refer to the suppression of the goal state inference
when the subordinate clause in (6) is processed.
Because (5) describes a neutral scenario, the goal state
derived while processing the progressivized VP is
maintained in the final model. In conclusion, whereas
(5) involves an extension of the initial discourse model,
(6) might induce a recomputation. Since (7) and (8) do
not involve a canonical goal, they will require an
extension only.
Predictions for ERPs
The only difference between neutral and disabled
activities (e.g. ‘writing letters’) is the noun in the subor-
dinate clause, ‘tablecloth’ or ‘paper’. In both cases the
initial model is simply extended, thus we expect to
observe only local ERP differences related to the integra-
tion of the differing nouns. As ‘tablecloth’ is less seman-
tically related to the other lexical items occurring in the
sentence compared to ‘paper’, we expect a larger N400
for the former compared to the latter word.
Processing a ‘when’ clause following an accomplish-
ment (e.g. ‘writing a letter’) involves integrating the
differing nouns and, in the disabling case, recomputing
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neutral noun ‘tablecloth’ is predicted to evoke a larger
N400 compared to the disabling ‘paper’, reflecting a
lower degree of semantic relatedness with the preceding
context. In our ERP study Dutch materials were used,
where the verb in subordinate clauses occupies the sen-
tence-final position (see ‘‘Materials” section). The tem-
poral and causal information provided by verbs in
‘when’ clauses is necessary to initiate the recomputation
process (Baggio & van Lambalgen, 2007). Thus, the
ERP effects of what we have analyzed as recomputation
are expected to surface at the sentence-final verb ‘spilled’
(‘morste’ in our Dutch stimuli, see ‘‘Materials” section
and Table 1).
One additional prediction is that the amplitude of
the ERP effect evoked by disabled accomplishments
is correlated with the relative frequency with which
readers infer that the goal state was not attained.
Recomputation is expected to consistently evoke a
time-locked shift in the EEG in each trial in which
a negative judgment concerning the attainment of
the goal is made. Therefore, the higher the frequencyTable 1
Examples of stimulus sentences
Context sentences
De deur van de woonkamer w
The door of the living-room wa
‘The door of the living room w
Target sentences
(A) Het meisje was brieven aan he
The girl was letters on the to-w
‘The girl was writing letters w
(B) Het meisje was brieven aan he
The girl was letters on the to-w
‘The girl was writing letters w
(C) Het meisje was een brief aan h
The girl was a letter on the to-
‘The girl was writing a letter w
(D) Het meisje was een brief aan h
The girl was a letter on the to-
‘The girl was writing a letter w
Probe sentences
(E) Het meisje heeft een of meer b
The girl has one or more letter
‘The girl has written one or m
Het meisje heeft geen brief ges
The girl has no letter written.a
‘The girl has written no letter’
(F) Het meisje heeft een brief gesc
The girl has a letter written.a
‘The girl has written a letter’.b
Het meisje heeft geen brief ges
The girl has no letter written.a
‘The girl has written no letter’
a Literal translation.
b Paraphrase.of such inferences—the larger the number of trials in
which recomputation occurred—the larger the ampli-
tude of the ERP component. The method and
results of an ERP study in which these predictions
were tested are described below.Methods
Materials
The set of Dutch materials used in the experiment
included 160 test and 160 filler items (see Supplementary
Material). Each test item included two context sentences
providing a neutral setting for the events, four target
sentences (A)–(D) and two probe pairs (E) and (F)
(Table 1). Target sentences were constructed by manip-
ulating the aspectual class of the progressive VP (activity
or accomplishment) and the effects of the event intro-
duced by the ‘when’ clause (neutral or disabling) on
the event described in the main progressive clause. All
progressive VPs were instances of the Dutch periphrasticas gesloten. Binnen speelde de radio klassieke muziek.
s closed. Inside played the radio classical music.a
as closed. Inside the radio played classical music’.b
t schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het tafelkleed morste.
rite when her friend coffee on the tablecloth spilled.a
hen her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth’.b
t schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het papier morste.
rite when her friend coffee on the paper spilled.a
hen her friend spilled coffee on the paper’.b
et schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het tafelkleed morste.
write when her friend coffee on the tablecloth spilled.a
hen her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth’.b
et schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het papier morste.
write when her friend coffee on the paper spilled.a
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is to be preferred to the use of the Dutch simple past
which, in some cases, is aspectually ambiguous between
perfective and imperfective readings. Accomplishments
differed from activities in the object NP only: an indefi-
nite (‘een brief’/‘a letter’) was used for accomplishments,
a bare plural (‘brieven’/‘letters’) for activities. Disabling
and neutral subordinate clauses differed only in the
prepositional or object NP, for instance ‘papier’ and
‘tafelkleed’. Neutral and disabling events were distin-
guished based on the experimenters’ judgment (but see
‘‘Entailment questionnaire” section for some data sup-
porting these choices). Probe pairs (E) were used with
activities and (F) with accomplishments (Table 1).
Fillers were 160 sentences of varying length, structure
and content. Analogously to test items, fillers were pre-
ceded by two neutral context sentences and followed by
a probe pair. Target sentences described an event consis-
tently, as in (9), or inconsistently, as in (10), with factual
knowledge (see (Hagoort et al. (2004) for an experiment
based on these stimuli):
(9) Dutch trains are white and very crowded.
(10) Dutch trains are yellow and very crowded.
Probes were of the type ‘Trains in the Netherlands
are white.’/‘Trains in the Netherlands are yellow.’ These
fillers were chosen to add variety to the materials while
preserving the task used for test items.
Four test versions were constructed, comprising ran-
domized lists of test and filler items. The task was iden-
tical for critical and filler sentences. Participants had to
select the correct probe based on the information pro-
vided by the context and target items. Mean length,
raw and lemma frequency of the differing nouns in the
NP of subordinate clauses were matched using the
CELEX Dutch corpus (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Guli-
kers, 1996). Mean length was 7.9 letters (SD = 2.46)
for neutral and 7.75 (SD = 2.79) for disabled cases,
and was kept below 12 letters in any case. Raw fre-
quency per million words was 1113 (SD = 2462) for neu-
tral and 1096 (SD = 2792) for disabled cases. Lemma
frequency per million words was 1730 (SD = 3559) for
neutral and 1666 (SD = 3585) for disabled cases. The
length of sentence-final verbs was identical across
conditions and was kept below 12 letters in any case.
Cloze probabilities of sentence-final verbs were normed
in a dedicated pre-test discussed below.
Pre-tests
Cloze probability test
In order to determine the cloze probabilities of sen-
tence-final verbs, context sentences followed by a target
sentence with the final word blanked were presented to a
group of 32 native speakers of Dutch (mean age 22.5, 27female). Participants were requested to fill in the blank
with the first word that came to their mind. Four ver-
sions (40 items per condition), randomized and balanced
across conditions, were constructed. Mean cloze proba-
bilities were not different between the conditions (all
comparisons using t-tests, P > :05) in each test version
as well as in the entire set.
Entailment questionnaire
A paper-and-pencil judgment task was also adminis-
tered. Thirty six Dutch native speakers (mean age 22.5,
28 female) were presented with the context followed by
a target sentence and a probe pair. The task was to select
the appropriate probe. Negative probes were more fre-
quently chosen for disabled accomplishments than for
the other conditions. Neutral activities (S1) (see Table
1) showed the lowest mean of negative responses
(M = 2.72, SD = 3.22), followed by disabled activities
(B) (M = 8.06, SD = 7.05), neutral accomplishments
(C) (M = 1.03, SD = 9.23) and disabled accomplish-
ments (D) (M = 25.14, SD = 8.02) (see Baggio & van
Lambalgen, 2007 for details).
Participants
Thirty-one students participated in the ERP experi-
ment. Of these, seven were left out of the final analysis
due to a high number (>20%) of trials contaminated
by artifacts. This left us with twenty four participants
(mean age 22.5, 17 female), with no history of neurolog-
ical, psychiatric or cognitive disorders. Subjects were
selected from the database of the F.C. Donders Centre
for Cognitive Neuroimaging at the Radboud University
Nijmegen. Participants received €8 per hour or course
credits. None of the subjects who took part to the pre-
tests participated in the ERP experiment.
Procedure
After applying the electrodes (see ‘‘Recording”
section), participants were conducted into the experimen-
tal room and were asked to sit in front of a videomonitor.
The stimuli were presented as follows: the two context
sentences were displayed together on a single screen
(white on black background) for a variable duration (6,
7 or 8 s), depending on the length of the sentences them-
selves; next the target sentence, one of (A)–(D), was pre-
sented on the screen word-by-word (600 ms SOA, 300 ms
word duration; white on black background); the target
sentence was preceded and followed by a fixation cross,
presented for 1500 ms; finally, the probe pair, one of (E)
and (F), was shown on the screen (red on black back-
ground) and remained visible until the participant gave
a button-press; the probes were followed by a fixation
cross which lasted for 1500 ms. The same presentation
parameters were used for fillers. Participants were
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when the fixation cross was shown and to select the cor-
rect probe by pressing one of two buttons (left or right
on the button box) as quickly and accurately as possible.
The position on the screen (top or bottom) of the positive
and negative probe corresponded to the left and right
button respectively, and was counterbalanced across test
versions. In this way, participants could not prepare their
motor response before the probe pair was presented on
the screen. The experiment took about 2 h and was
divided into 24 blocks of 10 trials each.
Recording
EEG and EOG signals were recorded using Ag/AgCl
electrodes. The EOGwas measured from four electrodes:
one at the outer canthus of each eye, one below and one
above the left eye (FE). The EEG was measured from 28
electrodes, arranged according to American Electrophys-
iological Society conventions: Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, Fz, F4,
F8, FC5, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8,
CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, O1, and O2.
Two additional electrodes were placed on the left and
right mastoids, the former serving as the reference during
the measurement. All EEG and EOG electrodes were re-
referenced offline to a linked mastoid. EEG electrodes
were attached to an elastic cap, whereas EOG and refer-
ence electrodes were applied using two-sided adhesive
decals external to the cap. Electrode impedance was kept
below 5 kX throughout the experiment. The EEG/EOG
was amplified by a multichannel BrainAmp DC system,
with a 500-Hz sampling rate, a low pass filter set at
125 Hz and a 10-s time constant.
Data analysis
Data analysis was conducted using FieldTrip,1 a
MATLAB package for processing EEG signals. The fol-
lowing transforms were applied to each subject’s dataset.
Segments corresponding to the noun and the sentence-
final verb were extracted from the EEG with an interval
of 200 ms preceding and 800 ms following stimulus
onset. Baseline correction used the 200-ms interval pre-
ceding the onset of nouns, and the 100-ms interval fol-
lowing the onset of sentence-final verbs. The latter
choice was effected so as to prevent ERP differences in
the 400- to 600-ms interval following the onset of the
nouns from biasing the baseline correction for the ERPs
evoked by sentence-final verbs in the same time interval.
The use of such a baseline seems acceptable on grounds
that the expected recomputation effect at the verb would
not affect such largely exogenous components as the N1.1 For more information, see http://www2.ru.nl/fcdonders/
fieldtrip/.Artifact rejection was based on two FieldTrip functions:
the first detects and rejects all trials that contain activity
exceeding a threshold of ±100 lV; the second identifies
and discards trials contaminated with eye movements
or blinks by means of thresholding the z-transformed
value of the raw data in the EOG channels, preprocessed
using a band-pass filter of 1–15 Hz. A 30-Hz low-pass
digital filter was applied to the segmented, artifact-free
data. ERPs were obtained for each subject by averaging
over trials in each experimental condition. A 5-Hz low-
pass filter was used to produce the waveforms shown in
Figs. 2–5. Topographical plots and statistical analyses
were however based on the 30-Hz low-pass filtered data.
For the analysis of behavioral responses we
employed two repeated-measures ANOVA models with
Subject as the random effect, Aspectual Class (Activity/
Accomplishment) and Subordinate Clause Type (Neu-
tral/Disabling) as fixed effects, and the mean value of
either negative judgments (negative probes selected in
the response task) or decision times in each condition
as the dependent variables.
Statistical analyses of ERP data used a non-paramet-
ric randomization procedure (Maris, 2004; Maris &
Oostenveld, 2007) which took as input mean amplitude
(lV) values in each condition in time bins of 100 ms,
starting from the onset of the relevant word and ending
800 ms after, and produced as output a cluster of elec-
trodes (min. 1 and max. 28) in which the difference
between the conditions was significant in each time
bin, the sum of t-statistics in that cluster and Monte Car-
lo estimates of P-values.
For the correlation analysis (see Section Predictions
for ERPs), we calculated the difference between the
ERPs evoked by sentence-final verbs in subordinate
clauses—disabled (D) minus neutral (C)–following
accomplishments at anterior sites (Fp1, Fp2, F7-, F3-,
Fz-, F4-, F8-averaged) in the 500- to 700-ms interval
after the onset of the sentence-final verb (see ‘‘Event-
related brain potentials” section for motivation). Pear-
son’s product-moment correlation was computed to
determine whether the amplitude difference in ERPs var-
ied with the number of negative responses, quantified
again as the difference of negative judgments between
disabled (D) and neutral (C) accomplishments. The cor-
relation analysis was done on a per-subject basis (i.e.
each pair of data points in the correlation corresponded
to a single subject’s data).Results
Behavioral data
Neutral activities (S1) showed the lowest mean of
negative responses (M = 4.08, SD = 2.87), followed by
disabled activities (B) (M = 5.83, SD = 4.51), neutral
Fig. 1. Behavioral data. (a) Boxplot of the categorical responses. (b) Boxplot of the decision times. Conditions are represented on the
abscissa (see Table 1 for the corresponding labels). Negative responses and decision times are plotted on the ordinate. The solid line
within the boxes indicates the median, box height is equal to the interquartile range, whiskers represent adjacent values, and empty
circles denote outliers. The maximum of potential negative responses is 40.
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abled accomplishments (D) (M = 18.13, SD = 11.16).
The distribution of the data in the different conditions
appears rather similar, as indicated by box height and
whisker length in Fig. 1a. However, disabled accom-
plishments have a more spread-out distribution, suggest-
ing that inference patterns were less uniform across
participants. ANOVAs revealed significant main effects
of Aspectual Class and Subordinate Clause Type, and
a significant interaction between the two factors (Table
2, Fig. 1a). The observed pattern of responses supports
the linguistic views outlined above and replicates our
previous findings (see ‘‘Entailment questionnaire” sec-
tion). There is no difference in decision times (Table 2,
Fig. 1b): (S1), M = 2111 ms, SD = 677 ms; (B),
M = 2100 ms, SD = 680 ms; (C), M = 2070 ms,
SD = 646 ms; (D), M = 2086 ms, SD = 710 ms.
Event-related brain potentials
Nouns
Fig. 2 displays the ERP topographies and waveforms
elicited by activities. An N1 component peaking atTable 2





Aspectual class F(1,23) = 21.65 F(1,23) < 1
P < .001
Subordinate clause type F(1,23) = 23.60 F(1,23) < 1
P < .001
Aspectual class  Subordinate
clause type
F(1,23) = 17.20 F(1,23) < 1
P < .001approximately 100 ms is followed by a P2 component
with a trough at about 200 ms. The amplitude of the
N1 and F is not different between disabled and neutral
clauses: no significant clusters were found between 0
and 300 ms (all contrasts, P > 0:1). The N1–P2 complex
is followed by an N400. The amplitude of the N400 is
larger in neutral (‘tafelkleed’) than in disabling (‘papier’)
clauses (Fig. 2b): significant clusters with a central distri-
bution were found between 300 and 500 ms (Table 3,
Fig. 2a). No difference between neutral and disabling
clauses was found after 500 ms.
Fig. 3 displays the ERP topographies and waveforms
elicited by accomplishments. Also in this case, an N1–P2
complex can be observed. There is no difference between
neutral and disabling clauses, as no significant clusters
between 0 and 300 ms were found (all contrasts,
P > 0:1). The amplitude of theN400 is again larger in neu-
tral (‘tafelkleed’) than in disabling (‘papier’) clauses
(Fig. 3b). The effect lasts longer than the N400 observed
in activities: significant clusters with a central distribution
were found between 300 and 600 ms (Table 3 andFig. 3a).
No difference between conditions was found after 500 ms.
There is no overall difference between the two aspec-
tual classes. Cluster-based t-tests comparing the N400
effects in activities and accomplishments (corresponding
to testing the main effect of Aspectual Class in a para-
metric model) produced no significant clusters between
300 and 600 ms from noun onset (all contrasts,
P > 0:1). No difference was found in any of the remain-
ing time bins.
Sentence-final verbs
Fig. 4 displays the ERP topographies and waveforms
elicited by activities. Contrary to what we had observed
Fig. 2. Activities, noun. (a) Grand-average (N = 24) topographies displaying the mean amplitude difference between the ERPs evoked
by the noun in neutral compared to disabled activities. Circles represent electrodes in a significant cluster. (b) Grand-average (N = 24)
ERP waveforms from frontal, central and parietal electrode sites time locked to the onset (0 ms) of the noun in neutral and disabled
activities. Negative values are plotted upward.
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ited by neutral and disabling clauses. Moreover, there is
no difference between conditions in any of the remaining
time bins (Table 3).
Fig. 5 displays the ERP topographies and waveforms
elicited by accomplishments. No difference between dis-
abling and neutral clauses was observed in either theN1–P2 complex or the N400: no significant clusters
between 0 and 400 ms were found (all contrasts,
P > 0:1). While disabled and neutral activities do not
result in any robust differential effect in later time bins
(400–800 ms; Table 3 and Fig. 4), disabling verbs follow-
ing accomplishments evoked larger negative shifts com-
pared to neutral verbs (Table 3, Fig. 5). The effect
Table 3
Summary of cluster-based statistics for the ERP data
Time Noun Sentence-final verb
Activities Accomplishments Activities Accomplishments
300–400 ms tð22Þ ¼ 16:54 tð22Þ ¼ 60:11
P ¼ :026 P < :001
400–500 ms tð22Þ ¼ 57:02 tð22Þ ¼ 78:69 tð22Þ ¼ 11:85
P < :001 P ¼ :002 P ¼ :034
500–600 ms tð22Þ ¼ 18:58 tð22Þ ¼ 71:09
P ¼ :022 P < :001
600–700 ms tð22Þ ¼ 39:16
P ¼ :008
700–800 ms tð22Þ ¼ 16:92
P ¼ :028
Disabling and neutral clauses are compared at the noun and at the sentence-final verb, for activities and accomplishments, in bins of
100 ms starting from word onset. The first significant effects occurred at 300–400 ms. Empty cells denote the absence of significant
clusters.
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final verb, lasts for approximately 400 ms, and is larger
over the more anterior scalp sites, in particular of the left
hemisphere. Based on its temporal profile and scalp dis-
tribution, we take this effect to be an instance of sus-
tained anterior negativity (SAN). The magnitude of
the SAN effect is correlated with the frequency of nega-
tive judgments in the response task (r ¼ 0:415; tð22Þ ¼
2:140; P ¼ :043; Fig. 6): the higher the number of
negative responses, the larger the amplitude of the SAN.
No difference between the two aspectual classes was
found. Cluster-based t-statistics comparing mean ERP
amplitudes in activities and accomplishments, again cor-
responding to testing the main effect of Aspectual Class
in a parametric model, produced no significant clusters
between 0 and 800 ms from noun onset (all contrasts,
P > 0:1).Discussion
The ERP results reported above can be summarized
as follows: the N400 elicited by nouns is larger in neutral
than in disabling clauses, following both activities and
accomplishments. This can be explained by the lower
degree of semantic association with the preceding words
(‘writing’, ‘letter’ or ‘letters’) of the noun in neutral
clauses (‘tablecloth’) compared to the noun in disabling
clauses (‘paper’). On the basis of our processing model,
we predicted that disabled accomplishments would
induce a different ERP response at the sentence-final
verb compared to neutral accomplishments. This corre-
sponds to the difference between the recomputation and
the extension of the initial discourse model (see ‘‘Mini-
mal models” section). The effect was expected to be (i)
absent in activities and (ii) correlated with the frequency
with which participants inferred that the goal state was
not attained. These predictions were borne out. Disabledactivities did not modulate ERPs at the verb. Disabled
accomplishments evoked sustained anterior negativities
(SANs). Moreover, a correlation of the SAN amplitude
with the frequency of negative judgments was observed.
Taken together, our results would seem to offer some
support for the recomputation hypothesis. Below we
address a few alternative explanations of the data and
some related outstanding issues.
Alternative explanations and outstanding issues
Local integration
An alternative account of the data would relate the
observed effect to difficulty in integrating the sentence-
final verb into the ‘local’, clause-level context, rather
than to suppressing a ‘global’, discourse-level inference.
If this were correct, a modulation of the N400 should be
expected, possibly correlated with differences in cloze
probabilities. However, as reported above, cloze proba-
bilities do not differ between conditions (see ‘‘Cloze
probability test” section). Also, there was no difference
in the N400s elicited by sentence-final verbs (see
‘‘Event-related brain potentials” section), which were
also lexically identical across conditions. Following ear-
lier work (Osterhout, 1997), we see the sustained ante-
rior negativity as reflecting difficulty in constructing a
discourse-level representation of disabled accomplish-
ments. Supported by further experimental evidence,
the recomputation hypothesis could provide a more
explicit characterization of at least one instance of sen-
tence-final ‘wrap-up effects’, in terms of restructuring
the initial model.
Response frequency
Another alternative account would be based on the
observation that sentences requiring a negative response
(disabled accomplishments) are relatively less frequent
than sentences requiring a positive one (activities and
Fig. 3. Accomplishments, noun. (a) Grand-average (N = 24) topographies displaying the mean amplitude difference between the ERPs
evoked by the noun in neutral compared to disabled accomplishments. Circles represent electrodes in a significant cluster. (b) Grand-
average (N = 24) ERP waveforms from frontal, central and parietal electrode sites time locked to the onset (0 ms) of the noun in
neutral and disabled accomplishments. Negative values are plotted upward.
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respectively 1/4 and 3/4 (see ‘‘Behavioral data” section
for the actual behavioral data). On this view, a modula-
tion of the P3 component (Donchin, 1981; Ruchkin,
Johnson, Cacoune, Ritter, & Hammer, 1990) might be
expected, inversely correlated with the frequency of nega-tive judgments to disabled accomplishments: the less fre-
quent the negative responses, the larger the amplitude of
the P3. However, in our experiment no P3 response was
observed and, moreover, the correlation was rather the
inverse: the more frequent the negative responses, the
larger the amplitude of the sustained anterior negativity.
Fig. 4. Activities, sentence-final verb. (a) Grand-average (N = 24) topographies displaying the mean amplitude difference between the
ERPs evoked by the sentence-final verb in disabled compared to neutral activities. (b) Grand-average (N = 24) ERP waveforms from
frontal, central and parietal electrode sites time locked to the onset (0 ms) of the verb in neutral and disabled activities. Negative values
are plotted upward.
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An important issue is whether the observed sustained
anterior negativity can be explained by a monotonic
account of the progressive. Similarly, it may be asked
whether the data reported here constitute compelling evi-
dence for non-monotonicity and against monotonicity.
One such alternative explanation can be formulated in
possible worlds semantics (Dowty, 1979; Kripke, 1963).In possible worlds semantics, the progressive denotes
a stage of a process which, if it does not continue in the
actual world, has chances of continuing in some other
possible world (de Swart, 1998). The latter may be called
‘inertia worlds’, courses of events in which the process is
not disturbed by external forces and is therefore brought
to a successful end. In his analysis of the progressive,
Dowty (1979) claimed that the following are equivalent:
Fig. 5. Accomplishments, sentence-final verb. (a) Grand-average (N = 24) topographies displaying the mean amplitude difference
between the ERPs evoked by the sentence-final verb in disabled compared to neutral accomplishments. Circles represent electrodes in a
significant cluster. (b) Grand-average (N = 24) ERP waveforms from frontal, central and parietal electrode sites time locked to the
onset (0 ms) of the verb in neutral and disabled accomplishments. Negative values are plotted upward.
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2. ‘The girl will have written a letter’ is true in all so-
called ‘inertia worlds’, worlds which are identical with
the present world until ‘now’, but then continue in a
way most compatible with the history of the world
until ‘now’.These insights can be rendered into processing terms.
Processing neutral accomplishments involves moving
from the actual world, a snapshot of which is provided
by the progressive clause, to some inertia world, in
which the goal state is eventually attained (the behav-
ioral data reported in ‘‘Behavioral data” section show
Fig. 6. Scatter plot displaying the correlation between the
amplitude of the sustained anterior negativity elicited by
disabled accomplishments and the frequency of negative
responses ðr ¼ 0:415; tð22Þ ¼ 2:140; P ¼ :043Þ. The mean
difference of negative responses between disabled and neutral
accomplishments is plotted on the abscissa. The mean ampli-
tude difference at fronto-polar and frontal electrodes between
disabled and neutral accomplishments in the 500- to 700-ms
interval following the onset of the sentence-final verb is plotted
on the ordinate.
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disabled accomplishments amounts to proceeding from
the actual world to a relatively unexpected ‘non-inertia
world’, in which the process is disrupted by some event,
such as spilling coffee on the paper. Accessing a world in
which the goal state is not attained may be surprising.2
The sustained anterior negativity may then be construed
as an index of surprise or some other equivalent notion.
This account is monotonic, as for both neutral and dis-
abled accomplishments interpretation involves shifting
from the actual world to another accessible world. A
simple extension of the initial model is performed in
both cases.
This analysis is seemingly in conflict with the non-
monotonic one. Still, there is no real opposition between
the two as regards these data. In both accounts, an ini-
tial commitment to the occurrence of the goal state is
made. In the non-monotonic approach this takes the
form of a defeasible inference leading to a minimal
model, whereas in the monotonic theory it is rather a
prior, positive expectation concerning the attainment
of the consequent state, and thus a lower probability2 This particular combination of possible worlds semantics
and surprise was proposed by an anonymous reviewer of this
paper, hence our choice of discussing it here. The same applies
(for different reviewers) to the issues discussed in ‘‘Interruption
and termination of activities” and ‘‘Goal states and underspe-
cification” sections.assigned to its failure. This commitment is necessary,
because accessing a possibile world in which the goal
state is not satisfied can be surprising only if there is such
a prior expectation. Furthermore, in both accounts a
subsequent revision of the initial commitment is made.
In the non-monotonic analysis this is a recomputation
of the initial minimal model, whereas in the monotonic
one it is a recomputation of the initial (low) probability
associated with the possible world in which the goal
state is not attained.
So there is recomputation and non-monotonicity
built into this ‘monotonic’ theory too. The possible
worlds account is monotonic as far as models are con-
cerned (models are always extended and never recom-
puted), but expectations change non-monotonically
(probabilities are recomputed). While prima facie
opposed, the two accounts are in this respect equiva-
lent. Our reasons for preferring a non-monotonic
account, one in which models are recomputed, derive
from a priori considerations. First, there exist forms
of non-monotonic inference formally strongly related
the non-monotonic reasoning in the progressive which
cannot be captured by Bayesian updates (Stenning &
van Lambalgen, 2008a). Second, minimal models and
non-monotonic inference can be implemented in neu-
ral networks (see ‘‘Recomputation in working memory
models” section). Last, our account of the progressive
is embedded into a larger non-monotonic framework
(Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2008b; van Lambalgen &
Hamm, 2004), covering other phenomena in reasoning
and language processing in children, adults, as well as
patients with ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder) (van Lambalgen et al., 2008) and ASD
(Autistic Spectrum Disorder) (van Lambalgen & Smid,
2004).
We must note however that our study was designed
to test a particular non-monotonic theory of the pro-
gressive, and not to discriminate between monotonic
and non-monotonic accounts of the same phenomenon.
The latter task would require, for one, a well-specified
entirely monotonic theory—that is, one which does not
involve recomputation of models, probability values or
other processing parameters—and, moreover, a set of
predictions in which the two proposals would actually
differ. This is admittedly hard, apart from being beyond
the scope of the research reported above. Hence the need
to emphasize the direction along the theory-observation
path which is relevant here: although it can be argued
that our non-monotonic theory leads to predictions that
are consistent with the observed sustained anterior neg-
ativity, it is clearly not the case that the data support
only this particular theory.
Interruption and termination of activities
It may be argued that, compared to disabled accom-
plishments, disabled activities are inherently simpler
50 G. Baggio et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 59 (2008) 36–53because they involve at most an interruption of the activ-
ity, for example writing letters in (B), which may be con-
tinued on some other paper sheets. Accomplishments
might leave a more definite ERP trace because they lead
to the termination of the activity, for example writing a
letter in (D), which cannot be continued being there only
a single sheet. On this view, the sustained anterior nega-
tivity would not be related to model recomputation (as
opposed to monotonic extension), but to the termina-
tion (as opposed to the interruption) of the activity.
Such an explanation follows from the seemingly plausi-
ble notion that computing a model in which the effects of
a given event are more ‘catastrophic’ should also be
more difficult. Here semantic theory comes to our rescue
and suggests that such notion is in fact misguided.
One issue that plays a role here is a type/token dis-
tinction concerning the noun ‘letter’. In the token inter-
pretation of ‘letter’ as referring to some particular
scribbles on a particular piece of paper, there is indeed
a difference between interruption and termination. How-
ever, on a type interpretation of ‘letter’ as referring to
particular content which can be inscribed on any piece
of paper, the activity and the accomplishment case seem
comparable, in that in both cases the girl has to reach for
a new piece of paper. On the type reading, one wouldn’t
even expect a difference in behavioral responses. None-
theless, since a behavioral difference was observed, it
seems the token reading is what subjects adopt. On this
assumption, it can be shown that, contrary to the alter-
native proposal, there is more computation going on in
the interruption case compared to the termination
case—if goal states are not taken into account; if they
are, the pattern is reversed as implied by the recomputa-
tion hypothesis. It seems harder to compute a model in
which an activity is first interrupted, then re-initiated,
compared to computing a model in which the activity
is just terminated (van Lambalgen & Hamm, 2004).
The alternative account would predict a larger sustained
anterior negativity for activities compared to accom-
plishments, which does not fit the experimental results.
Also in this case, however, we are ready to acknowledge
that a different model, in which terminations are shown
to be more costly than interruptions, and in which goal
states are not invoked to account for such processing
cost, may explain the observed sustained anterior
negativity.
Goal states and underspecification
The processing model adopted here implies that, as
soon as an accomplishment in the past progressive is
encountered, the system constructs a semantic represen-
tation in which the goal state is satisfied. Processing the
clause ‘The girl was writing a letter’ amounts to comput-
ing a minimal model in which the writing activity leads
to a complete letter, which is therefore part of the result-
ing discourse structure. As we have hypothesized, suchcomputation is defeasible, that is, the model can be
recomputed if further discourse information implies that
the goal state is not satisfiable, as in (6). One may ask
whether the claim that the goal is part of a minimal
model of the progressive clause is at all tenable. A seem-
ingly more plausible account would assume that an
underspecified model, in which it is left undecided
whether the goal state is attained or not, is computed
while the progressive clause is processed, and a decision
is made only at the subordinate clause.
The main problem with an underspecification-based
account is that, while it is true that the information pro-
vided by the progressive clause is insufficient for deter-
mining whether the goal was attained (which would
motivate the construction of an underspecified model
at that stage), it is not the case that sufficient information
is contributed by the subordinate clause. While disabling
clauses provide evidence that the activity was termi-
nated, and thus license the inference that the goal was
not attained, no evidence concerning the satisfaction of
the goal state is derivable from neutral clauses. This is
a consequence of the well-known ‘frame problem’
(McCarthy & Hayes, 1969), which implies that it is
impossible to enumerate all the effects and non-effects
of an event. For example, that ‘spilling coffee on the
tablecloth does not affect the writing activity’ (if that is
the case) is not stored in declarative memory, but must
be inferred. This is an instance of ‘closed world reason-
ing’, which was described above (see ‘‘Minimal models,
inference in the limit and recomputation” section). In
a ‘closed world’, it is assumed that no obstacle to attain-
ing the goal state occurred. Therefore, a letter was com-
pleted. The behavioral data reported above show that
subjects draw this inference or, equivalently, they are
more likely to give positive responses to neutral accom-
plishments. Processing models based on underspecifica-
tion—or on parallel processing, for that matter—
would have to explain why that very same conclusion
(‘the girl wrote a letter’) is not drawn when the system
is faced with the relevant input (the VP in the progres-
sive), and is instead delayed until the end of the sentence,
where critical information is nonetheless still missing.
The hypothesis that the goal state inference is drawn
when the input is given seems to be more consistent with
the available evidence on immediacy and incrementality
in discourse processing (Hagoort & van Berkum, 2007).
This line of reasoning speaks also to the issue of the
potential influence of the primary response task on
online interpretive processes. It can be argued that the
system may have carried out a number of inferences
online in order to facilitate a response when the probes
were presented, but would have processed the same sen-
tences in an underspecified manner if no response task
was administered. The brain would therefore compute
representations which are merely ‘good enough’ for the
task at hand, striking a balance between efficiency and
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Ferraro, & Bailey, 2002; Ferreira & Patson, 2007). We
grant that this is a possibility, which cannot be excluded
based on either our data or our processing model. It can
however be suggested that, although comprehension
probes do not occur in actual language use, it is possible
to imagine ‘language games’ in which hearers are
required to make interpretive commitments and form a
belief concerning the potential outcomes of a process
described using the progressive. Our experiment may
be taken as a laboratory study of such real world situa-
tions, but is not intended as a realistic account of all sit-
uations in which progressive constructions are uttered
and understood. Further work is needed to investigate
the influence of the response task on online ERP
measures.
Recomputation in working memory networks
Minimal models can be regarded as the stable states
of associated neural networks. It has been shown that
recurrent networks can compute or approximate
(depending on the expressiveness of the logical formal-
ism) the semantic operators based on which minimal
models are constructed (Hitzler, Ho¨lldobler, & Seda,
2004; Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2005, 2008a). In this
framework, recomputation can be modeled as the the
readjustment of connection strengths driven by a simple
form of back-propagation called ‘perceptron learning’
(Rosenblatt, 1962). Computing a minimal model of the
progressive clause will correspond to the network set-
tling into one such ‘attractor’ or stable state. Further
computation on the initial model brings the network
from its initial stable state to another stable state, corre-
sponding to the new minimal model. Importantly, there
is a large difference in the overall pattern of network
activity in disabled compared to neutral accomplish-
ments. If the initial model is monotonically extended,
as in the neutral case (4), a number of units will be acti-
vated which were previously silent, while the activation
state of the remaining units, including those representing
the goal state (the complete letter), will remain unal-
tered. But if the initial minimal model is recomputed
upon encountering the subordinate clause in (6), units
which were silent will be activated and the activation
patterns across some units which were previously active
will be readjusted. For instance, the units representing
the goal state (the complete letter) will no longer be
active. In the neural network this is achieved by succes-
sive applications of perceptron learning.
Even though in both cases the network processes the
subordinate clause by settling into a new attractor state,
the transition in the disabling case requires an extensive
adjustment of the connection weights of the units repre-
senting the goal state. Recomputation thus results in a
more costly state transition. It remains an open questionwhether biologically plausible networks can also
approximate the semantic operators which give rise to
minimal models. Firing rate models, for instance, have
been used to implement operations in connectionist net-
works (e.g. multilayer perceptrons) of the kind required
by the construction of minimal models (de Kamps & van
der Velde, 2002). Interestingly, recurrent excitation in
firing-rate models can account for several aspects of per-
sistent activity in prefrontal cortex neurons during
working memory tasks (Durstewitz, Seamans, & Sej-
nowski, 2000). Recurrent networks thus suggest a plau-
sible mechanistic link between recomputation and
sustained anterior negativities, and in general between
working memory processes and sustained anterior nega-
tivities (Felser et al., 2003; Fiebach et al., 2002; King &
Kutas, 1995; Mu¨ller et al., 1997; Mu¨nte et al., 1998; Phil-
lips et al., 2005; van Berkum et al., 1999, 2003).
As we noted in Introduction, a cognitive neurosci-
ence of language needs to bridge the gap between psy-
cholinguistic and formal models of specific aspects of
language on the one hand, and the neural architecture
underlying neurophysiological measures on the other
hand. For a number of reasons (Poeppel & Embick,
2005) this is a daunting task, which we do not claim to
have adequately solved. However, tentatively the follow-
ing can be said. There is no indication or proof that the
sustained anterior negativity is a language-specific ERP
effect. Most likely, it reflects the recruitment of neuro-
physiological activity that might be generated in pre-
frontal cortex, and is triggered by different cognitive
operations which build upon working memory capacity.
For this purpose, the prefrontal cortex is a plausible can-
didate from a neurobiological point of view. In the light
of our model, the sustained anterior negativity is taken
to index the recomputation following the blocking of
the goal state in accomplishments, and the recruitment
of working memory resources required for this recompu-
tation. In other cases, the demand might be triggered by
different cognitive operations, as in the work by Mu¨nte
et al. (1998). In general, what we seem to obtain with
ERPs, is a many-to-one mapping from cognitive models
to neuronal implementation. This however in no way
invalidates our interpretation, which is based on com-
bined constraints from the cognitive and neuronal levels
of analysis.
The research presented in this paper extends the
range of phenomena to which ERPs can be applied,
by testing a processing hypothesis suggested by a for-
mal semantics of tense and aspect. Our results raise
the possibility that the brain supports some form of
non-monotonic recomputation to integrate information
which invalidates previously held assumptions. It is a
task for future research to provide more stringent tests
of non-monotonic as opposed to monotonic models of
semantic processing and cognitive update more
generally.
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